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Objectives of Government Policy in Leasing Mineral Lands

To
serve his citizens best, the statesman should act much like a private
landowner maximizing his net income from lands. He should resist the
temptation to use his power to manipulate and control, foster and suppress,
divert and channel, reward and punish on the too easy presumption that the
market has no rationale or normative value of its own. . . . → Read More: Objectives of Government Policy in Leasing Mineral Lands

Land and Rent in Welfare Economics

In the classical synthesis, human welfare and land rent were two parts of an integrated philosophy. As Smith, Mill, Marshall, and especially Ricardo scan us from their present eyries they must note with shock two virtually separate disciplines tagged “land economics” and “welfare economics.” The first has come to connote Wisconsin Institutionalism with its skepticism of marginal analysis, its emphasis on evolution, . . . → Read More: Land and Rent in Welfare Economics

When to Build What

This paper purports to solve a particular kind of problem that characterizes urban expansion and evolution: when replace a collection of individual apparatuses (CIA) with a mass system. Examples include replacing individual septic tanks by sewers, well to public water supply, private cars by mass transit, trash burners by public pickup, coal or fuel by line-distributed gas or electric power, . . . → Read More: When to Build What

How a Water Market Might Work

This will not be a perfect market. There will be only one seller, and the buyers will surely form a user’s association. But this should not deter us. No human institution is perfect, except some that are perfectly awful. The present water market is one of these, and the point is to make it less awful. Maximum feasible improvement is the . . . → Read More: How a Water Market Might Work